Just Saying 'Maybe' to Terrorism

By GIL TROY

The Forward, JUNE 14, 2002

It seemed so simple after September 11. President Bush had found his calling. This domestic policy president, infamously untutored on foreign policy matters, would devote himself to eradicating terrorism. Echoing the moral clarity of Franklin Roosevelt fighting Nazis, of Abraham Lincoln fighting slavery, on September 20 Bush declared: "Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there.... Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists."

Nearly nine months later, this no-holds-barred assault on terrorism has imploded. The Bush doctrine of zero tolerance for terrorism has collapsed, unable to sustain the weight of the rhetoric or the breadth of the vision.

In fairness, Bush experienced some great successes: American power has routed the Taliban, destroyed Al Qaeda's infrastructure and subdued the Arab street. October's hysterical warnings imputing near mythical power to all three seem laughable now. Russia's disastrous precedent in fighting the mujahedeen, the rigors of the Afghan winter, the power of the Muslim masses, are yesterday's overblown headlines. Nevertheless, today's situation is trickier than expected. Bush junior's "just say no to terror" is proving to be as unsustainable as Bush senior's "New World Order."

Far too many Jews have concluded that terrorism becomes more tolerable when Israelis die rather than "innocent" Americans. These critics note Secretary of State Colin Powell's repeated condemnation of Israeli "provocations" when the Israeli army fights terrorists. They note that despite 95 Palestinian terrorist attacks that killed 191 people in 2001, the State Department's report, "Patterns in Global Terrorism, 2001," only lists nine attacks that killed 56 people.

It does seem that there is an unspoken Powell corollary to the Bush doctrine, namely, that only the United States may respond as aggressively as it wants, wherever and whenever it wants. But it is unfair to demonize Bush, who has been a great friend to Israel, or to ignore the many conflicting strategies and interests he is juggling with the old complaint of a double-standard regarding Israel.

In fact, the Bush doctrine has bogged down in numerous places, not just in the Middle East. The American government tolerates more ambiguity regarding terrorism than anyone likes to admit. In Southeast Asia, India justifiably protests the American alliance with Pakistan, whose secret service has bankrolled and coordinated many terrorist attacks in Kashmir and in India. Even many Americans are inconsistent. Despite the terrorists' slaughter of hundreds of Irish-American police officers, firefighters and office workers on September 11, have many Irish-Catholic Americans issued a mea culpa disavowing decades of support for the bloodthirsty Irish Republican Army? Bombing office buildings constitutes terrorism, whether in London or in Belfast or in Manhattan.

The real Bush doctrine mandates zero tolerance for terror against Americans, and great disapproval for terrorism everywhere else. This position is more nuanced than Reuter's relativistic nonsense that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Rather, the position stems from the realization that the world is a complicated place and that even a globo-cop must first advance its own interests.

Realpolitik is necessary but disturbing for Americans. The United States turned to Pakistan to fight the Taliban because of Pakistan's proximity to Afghanistan, and despite Pakistan's complicity in building up the Taliban and Al Qaeda, among many other Muslim extremists. Most international alliances are shot-gun marriages such as this one. Alas, Americans yearn for true love in international affairs.

This American romanticism feeds the characteristic presidential leadership tic of the modern era, the tendency to think too big and oversell too much. Woodrow Wilson could not just lead the United States into the European war in 1917, he had to pitch it as "the war to end all wars." Lyndon Johnson could not just urge Americans to be more generous to the unfortunate in the 1960s, he had to declare a "War on Poverty."

In such a political culture, wars, especially real ones, really get the rhetorical juices flowing. Wars have to be fought to save civilization, not simply to advance national interests. As a result, presidents have at different times declared Germany, Japan and Iraq to be enemies of civilization, repositories of evil. Such rhetoric helps clarify the target and mobilize the citizenry. But it is one thing to demonize an enemy which can be defeated — it is much harder, and possibly even foolhardy, to demonize a tactic that is not only popular in many different contexts, but is used or at least financed by some American allies. The Bush doctrine is suffering from "blowback" — even minor deviations from a policy of zero tolerance broadcast throughout the world appear to be major strategic shifts — and embarrassing policy failures.

All is not lost. In this justified war against a modern scourge, moral clarity is important, anger helpful, ambition useful. American leaders need to be honest and acknowledge when the doctrine does not play, when, say, Pakistan proves too valuable an ally to punish. Or when Syria assumes the United Nations Security Council presidency the same week that Islamic Jihad terrorists headquartered in Damascus murdered 17 Israelis in the Megiddo bus bombing. But Bush cannot fight terrorism and American tradition simultaneously. Americans want their president to think big, promise much, reach far. Especially after September 11, Clintonian band-aids will not suffice. Just as his predecessor did, Bush has to triangulate, finding a golden path between the rhetorical simplicity Americans crave and the multi-dimensional complexity any effective policy needs. That is why instead of just saying "no" to every terrorist everywhere, the United States will continue to find itself saying "maybe," sometimes, in some places.

A sophisticated pro-Israel strategy, therefore, will not simply connect the dots between Yasser Arafat and Al Qaeda; it will explain why supporting the Middle East's only democracy in a stormy sea of unstable dictatorships is the smart thing to do, as well as the right thing to do.