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Israeli intelligence had ample evidence egypt and syria were poised to attack in 1973, but discounted it because of prevailing assumptions
In retrospect, a few sickening seconds after the surprise attack, it all seems so obvious - how could the CIA neglect the many signals about al-Qa'ida's lethal intentions? How could Franklin Roosevelt's administration miss the hints about Japan's Pearl Harbour plans? How could the Israelis be blindsided by Egypt and Syria on the Jews' holiest day, Yom Kippur, in 1973?
Members of the commission exploring the U.S. failure on Sept. 11, 2001, should read Abraham Rabinovich's book on the Yom Kippur War. The devastating, sharply etched opening chapters provide more insight than dozens of hours of self-justifying backpedaling bureaucratic testimony ever will. By Oct. 5, 1973, Egypt had amassed 100,000 soldiers, 1,350 tanks and 2,000 artillery pieces and heavy mortars - in full battle array. Israel had 450 men scattered along the west bank of the Suez Canal, with only 44 artillery pieces and 290 tanks in the entire Sinai. Up north, Syria enjoyed an 8-to-1 advantage in tanks, even more in artillery and infantry. Moreover, Israel's leadership had been warned by reliable sources, including King Hussein of Jordan himself, about an imminent attack. Many other sources told Israeli intelligence that Egypt and Syria had cancelled military leaves, Russian diplomats had evacuated Cairo and soldiers had been ordered to eat during the day, even though it was the holy month of Ramadan.
One crucial thing, however, counterbalanced all these facts: the "concept." Israel just knew it would not be attacked, because Israel was sure that the Egyptians would not attack until the Soviets provided long-range fighter-bombers and the Egyptian army had Scud missiles to hit Tel Aviv. Besides, the "concept" assumed that the Arab armies were too weak and the post-1967 Israeli army was super- strong, just like the U.S. "concept" pre-Sept. 11 assumed that no large-scale terror attack would ever succeed in the continental U.S. And, typically, tragically, instructively, Israeli intelligence officers bristled whenever anyone dared suggest alternatives. The concept overruled all logic, all evidence - and helped condemn to death nearly 2,500 Israelis, as Egypt and Syria blindsided the Jewish state.
This "concept" accounts for the great disaster of the Yom Kippur War; the great miracle is that three weeks later, Israel had a beachhead in Egypt, and could have rolled into Damascus had Israelis been as aggressive as their detractors claim.
This well-paced journalistic tale focuses on Israel's counterattack. Written mostly from the Israeli perspective, it provides glimpses into the various Arab, Soviet and U.S. perspectives. The definitive account, telling the whole story in all its transcontinental dimensions, remains to be written.
Nevertheless, Rabinovich captures the fog of war without enshrouding the reader in an incomprehensible haze. Shifting back and forth, from the Golan Heights to the Sinai, from military headquarters to individual tanks, from Prime Minister Golda Meir's calm and Defence Minister Moshe Dayan's despair to the heroics of some soldiers and the pain of others, Rabinovich evokes the war's gore and grandeur.
In the modern Middle East, yesterday impinges heavily on today. It is hard to read the book without scrutinizing tidbits that seem relevant. Ariel Sharon, for one, lumbers throughout the book, part military genius, part megalomaniac, beloved by his troops, hated by his colleagues. Early in the war, Sharon and a few others understood that the best way to recover from the initial blow would be to plunge into enemy territory, even before the invaders were routed, especially in the vast Sinai. That aggressive, proactive strategy worked. Of course, history lacks the talismanic quality most readers wish it had. The story helps explain who Sharon is, but not what he might do today.
The willingness to counterpunch was only half the key to Israel's success; the troops' remarkable resolve and moral fibre provided the other. With their war plans trashed, their units often devastated, their state and their homes threatened, Israeli soldiers regrouped and retook the Golan Heights and the western Sinai. Rabinovich weaves a tapestry of heroism and pain, of fathers commanding sons, of strangers saving strangers, of friends and neighbours persevering.
Before briefing one such reconstituted unit, Battalion Commander Avigdor Kahalani quizzed the reservists about their jobs back home and the size of their families. Kahalani's subordinate was puzzled by the intrusion of the personal into the usually Spartan briefing. "Only later," Rabinovich writes, "would he understand that Kahalani was spinning a human web, creating of this disparate group of strangers thrown together on a remote battlefield a cohesive team willing, in moments of danger that would shortly be upon them, to risk death because he asked them to." Once they bonded, Kahalani told them they would spearhead an attempt to breach Syrian lines, saying, "I wish you all success. And, the main thing, fight like lions."
Democracies are supposedly slow to anger, but, once mobilized, are extraordinarily effective. A sense of community, common values and a common fate, are needed to galvanize reluctant warriors. During these perilous times, we need to think outside the box and question the prevailing "concepts" burdening our respective geostrategic outlooks; and, when necessary, we must "fight like lions." This powerful, inspiring book beautifully chronicles one such story - while reminding us of the terrible costs involved and the more powerful, inspiring vision of peace that we must pursue just as creatively and aggressively.
Gil Troy is a professor of history at McGill University.
The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that Transformed the Middle East
By Abraham Rabinovich
Schocken, 576 pages, $41.95
[Illustration]
Photo: COURTESY OF SCHOCKEN / Israeli forces moving through the Sinai toward the Suez Canal: the willingness to counterpunch was essential to Israel's success. ; Photo: Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan (left) and General Ariel Sharon on the west bank of the Suez Canal. ;
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